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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KEN HOLM and GLEN STEED 
d/b/a H & S ENTERPRISES, 
a partnership, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Civil No. 18067 
vs. 
B & M SERVICE, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs filed this action against defendant to 
recover damages for allegedly negligently damaging plaintiffs' 
personal property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was granted on the grounds 
that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs' claim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the district court's 
Order dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that on June 30, 1978, 
defendant negligently damaged plaintiffs' steel pipe when hauling 
it away from an ace ident scene at the request of the highway 
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patrol. Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed on August 5, 1981, in 
the district court for Salt Lake County, more than three years 
after the accident. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' 
Complaint on the grounds that the Complaint was barred by the 
applicable Utah statute of limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH STATUTE IS CLEAR ON ITS FACE 
AND UNEQUIVOCALLY BARS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-26 sets forth those civil 
actions which must be commenced within three years. Subsection 
(2) provides as follows: 
( 2) an action for taking, detaining or 
injuring personal property, including actions 
for specific recovery thereof; provided, that 
in all cases where the subject of the action 
is a domestic animal usually included in the 
term 'livestock, ' having upon it at the time 
of the loss a recorded mark or brand, if such 
animal had strayed or was stolen from the true 
owner without his fault, the cause shall not 
be deemed to have accrued until the owner has 
actual knowledge of such facts as would put a 
reasonable man upon inquiry as to the 
possess ion thereof by the defendant. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Unquestionably, the instant case is "an action for • 
injuring personal property." Appellants do not contest that the 
steel pipe in question was "personal property" and that the 
alleged damage was "injury" thereto. It is equally clear that a 
complaint of negligence is "an action." "An action," in absence 
of any restrictive words, is a broad generic term with comprehen-
sive application, and includes any judicial proceeding which 
- 2 -
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could result in a judgment. See, Dinsmore v. Barker, 61 Utah 
3 3 2 , 212 P • 110 9 at 1110 ( 19 2 3 ) • There is no limitation in the 
statute on the phrase "an action" which would justify the conten-
tion, made by appellants, that the statute refers to intentional 
torts only, and not negligence. Appellants argue that the word 
"injuring" must be read in conjunction with the words "taking, 
detaining." If 
statute should 
the Legislature had intended this result, 
have been worded "an action for taking 
the 
or 
detaining and injuring personal property." To read the statute 
as appellants suggest would lead to the absurd conclusion that 
the statute applies only where the taking or detaining property 
results in damage to the property, but would not apply to someone 
who took personal property but did not damage it. The only way 
to reasonably read the statute is that it applies to any action 
involving taking personal property, detaining personal property, 
"2£" damaging personal property. If the Legislature had intended 
to limit the statute strictly to intentional torts, or to just 
taking or detaining personal property, they could have easily so 
provided. 
Appellants contend that the applicable statute is Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-12-25{2), which provides a four year limita-
tion for "an action for relief not otherwise provided for by 
law." As has been seen, however, the present case is an action · 
which is otherwise provided for by law. The four year statute 
does apply to negligence actions for personal injuries (which are 
not otherwise provided for by law), but no personal injury is 
- 3 -
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involved in the instant case. Appellants contend, however, that 
inasmuch as personal property damage and personal injury may both 
be involved in some of the same cases, the same four year statute 
should apply. Of course, it could just as reasonably be 
concluded from this logic that the three year statute should 
apply to negligence actions where both property damage and per-
sonal injury are involved in the same case. If there is any 
merit in appellants' argument it should be made to the Legisla-
ture, which establishes the statute of limitations for the 
various classes of cases. The advantage of the present statutory 
scheme is it provides for one period of limitations applicable to 
damage to personal property, regardless of the theory under which 
the suit is brought. 
There is perhaps no better cannon of statutory interpre-
tation than where language is clear and unambiguous it must be 
held to mean that which it plainly expresses. Utah's three year 
statute of limitations clearly applies to negligence actions for 
injury to personal property. 
POINT II 
THE APPLICABLE CASE LAW COMPELS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE 
DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN APPLYING THE THREE YEAR STATUTE 
The cases which· discuss the statute before the Court on 
th is ·appeal can only be reasonably read as interpreting the sta-
tute as including all tortious (including negligent) damage to 
personal property. The best discussion of the statute in 
question is contained in Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative v. 
- 4 -
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Utah Ice & Storage Co., 187 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1951). In that 
case, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the defendant had 
negligently damaged a large quantity of eggs. The U.S. District 
Court, District of Utah, dismissed the action as being barred by 
the three year statute of limitations. The plaintiff appealed on 
the grounds that, although negligent injury of personal property 
would be barred by the three year statute of limitations, the 
warehouse receipt constituted a contract and therefore the case 
should be controlled by the statute of limitations governing 
contracts. Although the appellant court held that the action was 
tortious in nature, it reasoned that the three year statute would 
be applicable regardless of whether the action sounded in tort or 
contract: 
[IJt has been said that the statute is appli-
cable whether the suit is brought on "a negli-
gence theory or a breach of warranty theory." 
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Union Oil Co., 85 Cal. 
App. 2d 302, 193 P.2d 48, 51. See also 
Gosling v. Nichols, 59 Cal. App. 2d 442, 139 
P.2d 86; Lowe v. Ozmun, 137 Cal. 257, 70 P. 
8 7; Nathan v. Locke, 108 Cal. App. 158, 28 7 P. 
550, 291.P. 286. In speaking of the applica-
bility of this statute, tl;le Supreme Court of 
Utah in Reese v. Qualtrough, said "if the 
injuries are to personal property, the statute 
fixes the time within which such an action 
must be brought, and the name of the action 
can have no effect upon the question of what 
statute controls." 156 P. at 959. See also 
Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden, 112 Utah fil, --ra8° 
P.2d 995e Speaking of an identical statute, 
the Idaho Supreme Court in Common School 
District No. 18 v. Twin Falls Bank & Trust 
Co., 52 Idaho 200, 12 P.2d 774, 775, stated: 
The statute says 'an action.' It does not 
place the limitation upon an act ion in tort, 
but upon any action based upon a wrongful 
taking, detaining, or injuring of goods or 
chattels •••• " 
- 5 -
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In speaking of the immateriality of the 
"form of action' to which the statute is 
applicable, we think the courts undoubtedly 
used that term in its generic sense to denote 
a claim for relief on· any legal basis. ~ 
Dinsmore v. Barker, 61 Utah 332, 212 P. 1109. 
Certainly, there is nothing in the statute 
indicating a legislative purpose to cut off 
remedies for tortious injuries to personal 
property, while making it inapplicable to 
remedies for injuries resulting from the 
breach of contract. To so construe the sta-
tute would lead to an anomalous situation, 
with both a three year and a six year limita-
tion applying to the same act ion, depending 
merely upon the form in which the pleader 
chose to cast his complaint. See Common 
School District No. 18 v. Twin Falls-Bank & 
Trust Co., 52 Idaho 200, 12 P.2d 774, at page 
776. 
Id. at 653-54. 
The Utah Supreme Court also discussed an identical pre-
decessor statute in Reese v. Qualtrough, 156 P. 955 {1916). In 
that case, plaintiff alleged that the defendant destroyed 
plaintiff's fish. Defendant argued that the action was barred by 
the three year statute of limitations, but plaintiff, as in the 
instant case, argued that the four year statute was applicable. 
The court concluded that it did not make any difference what the 
action in which relief is sought is called: 
It is the wrongful acts which result in 
injury and damage which give the right of 
action, and, if the injuries are to personal 
property, this statute fixes the time within 
which such an action must be brought, and the 
name of the action can have no effect upon the 
question of what statute controls. 
Id. at 959 (emphasis added). 
The Reese case has been cited as authority for reaching 
the same conclusion in other jurisdictions. ~' Common School 
- 6 -
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District No. 18 v. Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co., 12 P.2d 774 
(Idaho 1932); Deetz v. Cobbs & Mitchell Co., 253 P. 542 (Or. 
19 27) • 
It is significant to note that appellant cites no cases, 
either in Utah or in another jurisdiction, which holds that this 
statute, or one like it, does not apply to negligent damage to 
personal property. In O'Neal v. San Pedro L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 38 
Utah 475, 114 P. 127 (1911) (discussed in Appellants' Brief at 
pp. 4-5), the plaintiff alleged that defendants constructed a 
railroad track adjoining h~s property and the movement of trains 
thereon damaged his real property. The defendant argued that the 
action was barred under a predecessor statute to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-12-26(1) wherein an action was barred if not brought 
within three years "f6r waste or trespass of real property." The 
present statute provides a three year statute of limitations for 
"an action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real 
property." (Emphasis added.) The court held that the action did 
not involve "trespass" but was what was called at common law an 
"action on the case" and therefore the three year statute con-
cerning trespass to real property was not applicable. The case 
is easily distinguishable from the instant case because the 
instant case does not involve real property and the precedessor 
statute involved in O'Neal made no reference to "injury to real 
property." The case of Welch v. Seattle & M.R. Co., 56 Wash. 97, 
105 P. 166 (1909) (discussed in Appellants' Brief at p. 15), 
involves the same distinction between an action for trespass and 
- 7 -
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an action on the case, where there was one limitation period for 
waste or trespass to real property, and another limitation period 
applicable to actions otherwise provided for by law, which was 
held to include an action on the case. The court in Dearden v. 
Hey, 24 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1939) (discussed in Appellants' Brief 
at p. 6), in fact notes that Massachusetts has a different limi-
tations period for negligence actions for damage to personal pro-
perty and negligence actions for personal injury. Id. at 646. 
The case involves a res jud ica ta issue, and does not challenge 
the distinction in the limitations period. 
CONCLUSION 
The only reasonable interpretation of the statute in 
question, and the cases which have discussed it, compels the 
conclusion that the statute bars a negligence action for damage 
to personal property if not commenced within three years after 
the cause of action has accrued. Accordingly, the district court 
was correct is dismissing this case and the dismissal should be 
affirmed. 
CHRIS~S~, JENSEN & PO~ELL 
By Utd~M----
Dale J. r{cimbert 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the .:1_ day of April, 1982, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoin9 Brief of Respondent was 
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mailed, postage prepaid to the following: 
Wendell P. Ables 
Suite 14, Intrade Building 
1399 South Seventh East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Attorney for Plain?J;;7~ -
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